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Abstract
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains not one but two kinds of equality rights—general
equality rights, set out in section 15, and linguistic equality rights, set out in sections 16 to 23—but the
relationship between them is not well understood. Do official language rights rest on a distinct set of
values, or do they simply instantiate the same general principle expressed in section 15? If the former,
what are these values, and how do they relate to other principles of constitutional justice? The matter is
further complicated by the need to account for the special constitutional status of Indigenous peoples,
who also claim a form of equality. If we are to do justice to all concerned, we need to determine if and
how these different claims to equality can and should fit together. However, this requires that we have a
clear account of their underlying principles, and our understanding of linguistic equality in this respect
lags far behind. While the concept of general equality and the status of Indigenous peoples have both
received sustained theoretical attention, linguistic equality has not, leaving a number of fundamental
questions—namely its basic analytical structure and its moral foundations—unresolved. The purpose of
this article is to lay the groundwork for a theoretical account of linguistic equality, one that situates this
concept within a broader framework of constitutional values that includes general equality rights and the
rights of Indigenous peoples.
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Towards an Account of Linguistic
Equality
ÉRIK LABELLE EASTAUGH*
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains not one but two kinds of equality
rights—general equality rights, set out in section 15, and linguistic equality rights, set out
in sections 16 to 23—but the relationship between them is not well understood. Do official
language rights rest on a distinct set of values, or do they simply instantiate the same
general principle expressed in section 15? If the former, what are these values, and how do
they relate to other principles of constitutional justice? The matter is further complicated
by the need to account for the special constitutional status of Indigenous peoples, who also
claim a form of equality. If we are to do justice to all concerned, we need to determine if and
how these different claims to equality can and should fit together. However, this requires that
we have a clear account of their underlying principles, and our understanding of linguistic
equality in this respect lags far behind. While the concept of general equality and the status
of Indigenous peoples have both received sustained theoretical attention, linguistic equality
has not, leaving a number of fundamental questions—namely its basic analytical structure
and its moral foundations—unresolved. The purpose of this article is to lay the groundwork
for a theoretical account of linguistic equality, one that situates this concept within a broader
framework of constitutional values that includes general equality rights and the rights of
Indigenous peoples.
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Te Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) contains not one but
two kinds of equality rights—general equality rights, set out in section 15, and
linguistic equality rights, set out in sections 16 to 23. Together, they account for
a substantial proportion of the Charter’s operative provisions.1 Nevertheless, and
despite the obvious connection between them, the relationship between these
two sets of rights is not well understood. Tus far, the courts have tended to view
them as analytically distinct, given that linguistic equality rights apply only to
two languages, English and French, while general equality rights are universal.
As a result, section 15 cannot be used to expand the scope of the Charter’s language

1.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 15, 16-23, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. In total, 8 of 21
rights-conferring sections of the Charter pertain to some form of equality. However, given
that some sections set out several distinct rights, the total proportion of equality rights
varies depending on how one performs the calculation. By my count, the Charter comprises
41 rights-granting provisions, of which 15 pertain to some form of equality right: (square
brackets indicate the number of rights/provisions) sections 2(a)-(d) [4], section 3 [1], sections
4(1) & (2) [2], section 5 [1], section 6(1) & (2)(a)-(b) [3], section 7-9 [3], section 10(a)-(c)
[3], section 11(a)-(i) [9], section 12-14 [3], section 15(1) [1], sections 16(1) & (2) [2],
section 16.1(1) [1], sections 17(1) & (2) [2], sections 18(1) & (2) [2], sections 19(1) & (2)
[2], sections 20(1) & (2) [2], sections 23(3)(a)-(b) [2], and section 28 [1].
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rights.2 But the courts have ventured little beyond this rule, and the general
implications of the underlying distinction are unclear. Do ofcial language rights
rest on a distinct set of values, or do they simply represent a particular instantiation
of the same general principle expressed in section 15? If the former, what are
these values, how do they relate to the broader framework of the constitution,
and what do they tell us about whether its current arrangements are just?
Answering these questions is difcult because it requires some account of
how Canada’s cultural and constitutional landscapes are enmeshed, which is no
simple task. Ofcial language groups are not the only cultural groups to enjoy
constitutional recognition. Indigenous cultures, for instance, have a special
constitutional status,3 and the growing movement to protect them, exemplifed
by the recently enacted Indigenous Languages Act,4 is premised in part on a claim
to equality. But the relationship between this claim and that of ofcial language
groups is unclear.5 While there are some obvious parallels between the goal of
political and social reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, on the one hand,
and the Charter’s system of language rights—which was adopted in response to
the long history of injustice towards French Canadians—on the other, there is
also a degree of tension between these two projects, given that the Constitution
currently elevates English and French above all other languages.6 Tis tension in
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

See e.g. Mahe v Alberta, [1990] 1 SCR 342 [Mahe]; Lalonde v Ontario (Commission de
restructuration des services de santé), 208 DLR (4th) 577 (Ont CA) [Lalonde]. See also
Warren Newman, “Understanding Language Rights, Equality and the Charter: Towards a
Comprehensive Teory of Constitutional Interpretation” (2004) 15 Nat’l Inst Just J 363 at
370 [Newman, “Understanding Language Rights, Equality and the Charter”].
Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Diference and the Constitution of Canada (University of Toronto
Press, 2001) at 12-16.
SC 2019, c 23.
See e.g. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, “Calls to Action” in Canada’s
Residential Schools: Reconciliation: Te Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
of Canada, vol 6 (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015) 223 at 225-26.
For example, consider the controversy surrounding proposals to impose French–English
bilingualism as a requirement for nomination to the Supreme Court of Canada. Supporters
argue that this is necessary in order to respect the legal equality of the two languages, while
many detractors argue (plausibly though not entirely convincingly) that this would make
it impossible to nominate an Indigenous person to the Court, since members of Canada’s
Indigenous peoples are rarely French-English bilingual. See e.g. Maxime St-Hilaire et al,
“L’opposition au bilinguisme obligatoire des juges de la Cour suprême est indéfendable
et induit sa propre forme de colonialisme,” Policy Options Politques (18 Décembre 2017),
online: <www.policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/december-2017/le-faux-debat-entreautochtones-et-francophones-au-sujet-des-juges-de-la-csc> [perma.cc/X7M4-KYC8]. See
also Conseil scolaire francophone de la Colombie‑Britannique v British Columbia, 2013 SCC 42
(Factum of the Intervenor Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs at 1, 9).
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fact dovetails with what some contend is a fundamental inconsistency between
Canada’s language rights system and its commitment to general equality and
multiculturalism, which would appear to oppose the special distinction aforded
to English and French.7 Any satisfactory answer to the questions outlined above
must ultimately address these apparently, and perhaps genuinely, inconsistent
claims of equality.
Tus, if we are to do justice to all concerned, we need to determine if and
how these diferent claims to equality can and should ft together. However,
this project requires that we have a clear account of their underlying principles.
Unfortunately, our understanding of linguistic equality in this respect lags far
behind, for while the concept of general equality and the status of Indigenous
peoples have both received sustained theoretical attention, linguistic equality has
not. Although the ofcial language rights system was the focus of considerable
theoretical attention in the late 1980s and 1990s, this work was conducted before
linguistic equality came to occupy the central organizing role it plays today.8
Te primary focus of these early eforts was the “political compromise doctrine,”
a theory adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in the late 1980s.9
According to this theory, language rights lack any principled foundation and
ought to be interpreted restrictively. In this view, language rights are “peculiar to
Canada” and “lack the universality, generality and fuidity of basic rights.”10 Tus,
unlike other Charter rights, such as the right to security of the person, language
rights are not “seminal in nature,”11 meaning that they should be interpreted
both narrowly and statically.12 Tis approach was heavily criticized in scholarly

7.

Peter H Russell, Canada’s Odyssey: A Country Based on Incomplete Conquests (University of
Toronto Press, 2017) at 306. For a critical take on the ofcial languages framework, see also
Eve Haque, Multiculturalism within a Bilingual Framework: Language, Race, and Belonging in
Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2012).
8. For a more detailed account of this role, see Part IV, below.
9. MacDonald v City of Montreal, [1986] 1 SCR 460 [MacDonald]; Société des Acadiens du
Nouveau‑Brunswick Inc v Association of Parents for Fairness in Education, [1986] 1 SCR 549
[Société des Acadiens]; Bilodeau v Manitoba (AG), [1986] 1 SCR 449 [Bilodeau]; R v Mercure,
[1988] 1 SCR 234 [Mercure]. Tese cases dealt with language use in a judicial context
under section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870,
section 19(2) of the Charter, and section 110 of the North‑West Territories Act. Each of these
provisions have similar wording and the SCC chose to interpret them all in the same manner.
10. MacDonald, supra note 9 at 500.
11. Société des Acadiens, supra note 9 at 578.
12. Ibid at 580.
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literature.13 Scholars seized on the opportunity to further explore some basic
theoretical questions.14 However, linguistic equality, as such, was not the focus of
these eforts, which were mainly preoccupied with the contention that language
rights are simply unprincipled artifacts of political horse trading.15 It was not
until the landmark case of R v Beaulac in 1999, when the SCC fnally rejected the
political compromise doctrine, that the principle of equality was placed squarely
at the centre of language rights law.16

13. See e.g. Pierre Foucher, “L’interprétation des droits linguistiques constitutionnels par la
Cour suprême du Canada” (1987) 19 Ottawa L Rev 381; Leslie Green, “Are Language
Rights Fundamental?” (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ 639; Leslie Green & Denise Réaume,
“Second-Class Rights—Principle and Compromise in the Charter” (1990) 13 Dal LJ 564
[Green & Réaume, “Second-Class Rights”]; Denise Réaume & Leslie Green, “Education
and Linguistic Security in the Charter” (1988) 34 McGill LJ 777 [Réaume & Green,
“Education and Linguistic Security”]; Alan Riddell, “À la recherche du temps perdu: la Cour
suprême et l’interprétation des droits linguistiques constitutionnels dans les années 80”
(1988) 29 C de D 829.
14. Réaume & Green, “Education and Linguistic Security,” supra note 13; Denise Réaume,
“Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods” (1988) 38 UTLJ 1; Denise Réaume,
“Te Group Right to Linguistic Security: Whose Right, What Duties?” in Judith Baker,
ed, Group Rights (University of Toronto Press, 1994); Denise G Réaume, “Justice between
Cultures: Autonomy and the Protection of Cultural Afliation” (1995) 29 UBC L Rev 117;
Denise Réaume, “Te Constitutional Protection of Language: Survival or Security?,” David
Schneiderman, ed, Language and the State: Te Law and Politics of Identity/Langue et état:
droit, politique et identité (Yvon Blais, 1989) [Réaume, “Te Constitutional Protection of
Language”]; Denise G Réaume, “Ofcial-Language Rights: Intrinsic Value and the Protection
of Diference” in Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, eds, Citizenship in diverse societies
[electronic resource] (Oxford University Press, 2000); Denise Réaume, “Language Rights:
Constitutional Misfts or Real Rights” in André Braën, Pierre Foucher, & Yves Le Bouthillier,
eds, Languages, Constitutionalism and Minorities/Langues, constitutionnalisme et minorité
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006); Linda Cardinal, “Langue, droit et politique: la théorie
libérale et le débat sur les langues minoritaires” in André Braën, Pierre Foucher, & Yves Le
Bouthillier, eds, Languages, Constitutionalism and Minorities/Langues, constitutionnalisme
et minorité (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006); Alan Patten, “Who Should Have Ofcial
Language Rights?” in André Braën, Pierre Foucher, & Yves Le Bouthillier, eds, Languages,
Constitutionalism and Minoritie/Langues, constitutionnalisme et minorité (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2006); Pierre Foucher, “Nations francophones et Constitution canadienne”
(2010) 30 Francophonies d’Amérique 89.
15. Tat being said, they may ultimately have some bearing on it. For instance, the account
developed by Green and Réaume, which centers on “linguistic security,” can be seen as an
argument that language rights ought to be viewed as protecting an interest in equality of
linguistic security. See Réaume, “Te Constitutional Protection of Language,” supra note 14;
Green, supra note 13; Green & Réaume, “Second-Class Rights,” supra note 13.
16. [1999] 1 SCR 768 [Beaulac].
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While Beaulac’s rejection of the political compromise doctrine was a welcome
development, the new paradigm it launched remains under-theorized. Te case
law has done little to clarify the principle of linguistic equality, and theoretical
analyses of language rights based in a legal perspective have become increasingly
rare17 (although the literature in normative political theory on the topic continues
to grow).18 Tis leaves a number of fundamental questions about the principle
17. As Doucet has noted, legal scholarship on language rights has shied away from questions of
theory. Michel Doucet, “Pourquoi une langue mérite-t-elle une protection constitutionnelle
ou legislative?” (2009) 11 RCLF 55 at 55 [Doucet, “Langue mérite-t-elle une protection?”].
Few scholarly texts have explored the concept of linguistic equality at any length, and they
typically limit themselves to a description and analysis of judicial statements on the topic and
propose little in the way of a broader explanatory framework. See e.g. Warren J Newman,
“La progression vers l’égalité des droits linguistiques par voie législative et judicaire”
(2004) 6 RCLF 19 [Newman, “La progression vers l’égalité des droits linguistiques”].
Newman, “Understanding Language Rights, Equality and the Charter,” supra note 2; Joseph
Eliot Magnet, Modern Constitutionalism: Identity, Equality and Democracy (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2004) [Magnet, Modern Constitutionalism]; Joseph Eliot Magnet, “Equality
between Linguistic Communities in Canada” in André Braën, Pierre Foucher & Yves Le
Bouthillier, eds, Languages, Constitutionalism and Minorities/Langues, constitutionnalisme
et minorité (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006) [Magnet, “Equality between Linguistic
Communities in Canada”]; François Boileau, “L’égalité réelle du français et de l’anglais
via le développement des communautés” in André Braën, Pierre Foucher & Yves Le
Bouthillier, eds, Languages, constitutionalism and minorities/Langues, constitutionnalisme et
minorité (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006); Vanessa Gruben, “Language Rights in Canada:
A Teoretical Approach” in Joseph Eliot Magnet, ed, Ofcial Languages of Canada: New
Essays (LexisNexis Canada, 2008); Joseph Eliot Magnet & Mark Power, “Institutional
Reform: Maintenance Claims and Equality for Canada’s Ofcial-Language Minorities” in
Joseph Eliot Magnet, ed, Ofcial Languages of Canada: New Essays (LexisNexis Canada,
2008); Michel Bastarache, “Le principe d’égalité des langues ofcielles” in Michel Bastarache,
ed, Les droits linguistiques au Canada, 3ième édition (Yvon Blais, 2013) at ch 2. Some authors
have attempted to connect linguistic equality to a structural account of the Constitution,
but without venturing to say much about the content of equality as a concept. See Pierre
Foucher, “La double dualité du Canada et ses conséquences juridiques” in Pierre Tibault et
al, eds, Les mélanges Gérald‑A Beaudoin: Les defs du constitutionnalisme (Yvon Blais, 2002),
ch 4. A notable exception to this general trend would be Sébastien Grammond, who has
sought to assess the compatibility of section 23 rights with principles of general equality
with respect to the question of group membership control. See Sébastien Grammond,
Identity Captured by Law: Membership in Canada’s Indigenous Peoples and Linguistic Minorities
(McGill-Queen’s Press, 2009) at 150-88.
18. Although sometimes examined as a standalone topic, language rights are also a recurring
theme in the literature dealing with multiculturalism, diversity, and national minorities,
which is too vast to list here. See e.g. Will Kymlicka & Alan Patten, eds, Language Rights and
Political Teory, vol 23 (Oxford University Press, 2003). For an excellent recent overview of
these topics with a particular relevance to language rights, see Allen Patten, Equal Recognition:
Te Moral Foundations of Minority Rights (Princeton University Press, 2014).
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of linguistic equality—namely its basic analytical structure and its moral
foundations—unresolved. Amongst other things, it is difcult to determine how
linguistic equality should infuence the content of any given language right. Tis
problem is most acutely felt in the context of a) provisions having a very general
character (such as section 16 of the Charter), where the concept of linguistic
equality could and should provide some much-needed scafolding; b) provisions
that are somewhat more detailed but have received little or no attention from
the courts (such as section 20 of the Charter and Part V of the Ofcial Languages
Act19 (OLA)) and thus still contain a large number of unresolved ambiguities; and
c) provisions, like section 16.1 of the Charter and Part VII of the OLA,20 that
are both very general and have received little judicial attention. What’s more, the
lack of clarity surrounding these more specifc issues makes it difcult to establish
how linguistic equality relates to other strands of equality found in Canadian
constitutional law, or to determine the extent of confict or common ground
between the principles underpinning these rights-granting provisions.

I. AIMS AND METHODOLOGY
What we need, in short, is a theoretical account of linguistic equality; one that
situates this concept within a broader framework of constitutional values that
includes general equality rights and the rights of Indigenous peoples. However,
developing such an account will be a substantial undertaking and beyond the
scope of a single article. Te aim of this article is thus to lay the groundwork for
such an account by outlining some of the main methodological and conceptual
challenges and to sketch out solutions to a limited number of them. My hope
is that this efort will make systematic progress easier to achieve going forward.
Because linguistic equality is a legal concept, the account I envision is one
that aims to ofer a legal theory of it—that is, one which explains or constructs
its meaning from within the parameters of legal discourse, following a broadly
“internal” perspective.21 Doing this requires that the “patterns of normative
understanding” already present in the law, which enable us to see it as a “working
whole,” be excavated and clarifed.22 Even if one’s ambition is to further develop
19. Ofcial Languages Act, RSC 1985, c 31 (4th Supp).
20. Ibid.
21. Richard A Posner, “Legal Scholarship Today” (2002) 115 Harv L Rev 1314 at 1315;
Christopher McCrudden, “Legal Research and the Social Sciences” (2006) 122 Law Q
Rev 632 at 633.
22. McCrudden, supra note 19 at 634.
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the law in areas where it is underdetermined, understanding these patterns
is critical, for they impose a number of “fxed points” that defne or at least
constrain the scope of the legally possible.23 Nevertheless, the concepts set out
in the primary legal sources do not exhaust the range of relevant considerations.
Like other Charter rights, ofcial language rights were enacted in furtherance of
some moral purpose, and so their “philosophic context”24— the broader set of
extra-legal moral concepts that shape our understanding of them25—must be
taken into account. A complete account of linguistic equality as a legal concept
must therefore endeavour to make sense of the moral intuitions refected in
the “patterns of normative understanding,” and provide a basis on which to fll
any conceptual gaps where issues of fundamental importance are unresolved.
It should, in other words, include an account of why linguistic equality, as a legal
norm, is morally justifed.
Tat being said, the precise manner in which principles of political morality
can or should afect our defnition of what the law requires is a complicated
question. I will take no defnite position on it here, preferring instead to focus
on the frst frst challenge, namely, the development of a workable model of
linguistic equality based on the “patterns of normative understanding” found
in the primary legal sources. Making sense of the moral intuitions or concepts
underlying these patterns requires that we frst have a clear account of them,
which we do not.26 I have thus chosen to focus here on excavating the structure of
linguistic equality as a legal norm and developing a workable conceptual model
to describe it.
Te following discussion is divided into six parts. Part I reviews some of
the difculties posed by equality as a concept in order to defne the nature of
the task ahead with greater clarity. In particular, I argue that the distinction
between “formal” and “substantive” equality, widely used as the starting point
for analyzing linguistic equality, is theoretically sterile and should be set aside
in favour of a more nuanced approach centered on what I call the axiomatic
constraints of equality. Part II then uses a selection of language rights cases to
illustrate this. Part III briefy explains why it is possible to develop a unifed
theory of linguistic equality despite the wide variety of legal measures referred
to using the rubric of “language rights” (which includes both statutory and
23. Robert Alexy, A Teory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002) at 2.
24. R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 344.
25. Nicholas Bamforth, Discrimination Law: Teory and Context, Text and Materials (Sweet &
Maxwell, 2008) at 171.
26. McCrudden, supra note 19 at 634.
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constitutional measures operating at both the federal and provincial/territorial
levels), while Part IV outlines my account of the central conceptual structure
that binds these norms together. More specifcally, I argue that the principle of
linguistic equality operates on two distinct but inter-connected levels. Te frst
level, which I call generic linguistic equality, refers to general principles applicable
to the entire language rights system. Te second level, special linguistic equality,
refers to more specifc conceptions of equality tied to particular contexts (like
education). Building on this, Part V argues that there are at least two principles
of generic linguistic equality—(1) individual linguistic equality and (2) collective
linguistic equality—and briefy describes each one. Part VI, by way of conclusion,
ventures some preliminary observations on how the principle of linguistic
equality, as outlined above, might be justifed from a moral standpoint.

II. EQUALITY AS A CONCEPTUAL SCHEMA
Equality is a notoriously difcult concept to defne. It is sometimes referred to
as an “essentially contested” concept on the grounds that achieving a consensus
on its meaning is efectively impossible.27 Tis problem is not limited to
philosophical debates but extends to legal discourse as well.28 For example, Chief
Justice McLachlin once noted that “[t]he language of equality is so open and
general that it is difcult to assign it precise legal meaning.”29 I therefore hope the
reader will share (or at least forgive) my inclination to begin by setting out some
of what I see as the basic features of equality as a concept. Both scholarly and
judicial commentary on linguistic equality generally lack clarity in this regard,30
and as I will explain below, this can hamper our understanding of what is truly
at stake in many cases. By stripping equality down to its conceptual bones,
I hope to more clearly defne the nature of the task ahead, and thus make it
easier to achieve systematic progress in developing a workable model of linguistic
27. Cass R Sunstein, “Incompletely Teorized Agreements” (1995) 108 Harv L Rev
1733 at 1739; WB Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts” (1955-56) 56 Proc
Aristotelian Soc’y 167.
28. Te SCC has noted that section 15 “is perhaps the Charter’s most conceptually difcult
provision.” See Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1
SCR 497 at 507.
29. Beverly McLachlin, “Equality: Te Most Difcult Right” (2001) 14 SCLR (2d) 17 at 17.
30. See e.g. Newman, “La progression vers l’égalité des droits linguistiques,” supra note 17;
Newman, “Understanding Language Rights, Equality and the Charter,” supra note 2;
Magnet, Modern Constitutionalism, supra note 17; Magnet, “Equality between Linguistic
Communities in Canada,” supra note 17; Boileau, supra note 17; Gruben, supra note 17 at
108-22; Magnet & Power, supra note 17; Bastarache, supra note 17.
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equality. However, in order to do so, it will be necessary to briefy rehearse some
points which may already be familiar to those well-versed in the literature on
general equality.
As a preliminary matter, it bears noting that, despite Chief Justice McLachlin’s
comment, equality is in fact—in one sense at least—a fairly straightforward
concept. To say that one thing is equal to another is to say that it amounts to the
same thing; that, to put it in mathematical terms, there is an identity between
them, as when we write “2 + 2 = 4.” Equality is thus a mode of comparison, the
purpose of which is to assert or ascertain the presence or absence of sameness.
Tis much at least is clear.
However, that mathematical example conceals a great deal of complexity,
for it rests upon a prior understanding of what is being compared. Te distinct
nature of “2 + 2” and “4” shows diferent sets of symbols that are clearly not
identical in all respects—for instance, they have diferent shapes and a diferent
number of components. Nevertheless, the relation is held to be true because the
two sets of symbols are understood to have the same numerical values. Tese
values are intuitively assumed to be the relevant property for the purposes of
comparison because the expression “2 + 2 = 4” is normally put forward as a
proposition of arithmetic, the axioms of which dictate that equality is a matter
of numerical values rather than visually discernible traits, such as shape. Without
the interpretive matrix supplied by these axioms, the proposition would
be meaningless.
Tus, to be intelligible, any statement asserting a relation of equality must
set out—or rest on a prior commitment regarding—the properties of interest.
In other words, equality is merely “a conceptual schema … [whose] open
variables must be flled out.”31 And therein lies the true challenge. Te issue is not
what “equality” means, as such, but rather (a) who or what should be compared,
and (b) in respect of which attribute. I draw attention to this point because
the way in which we discuss equality can sometimes obscure that underlying
reality. For example, it is common in legal discourse to distinguish between
putatively diferent “types” of equality, as when we draw a contrast between
“formal” and “substantive” equality. Tis gives the impression that equality
can take on fundamentally diferent forms, some of which may be better than
31. Stefan Gosepath, “Equality” in Edward N Zalta, ed, Te Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Metaphysics Research Lab, 2011) online: <plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/
equality> [perma.cc/YXY5-RDKR]. See also Michel Doucet, “Le concept de l’égalite dans
l’arrêt Lalonde et al c Commission de restructuration des services de santé” (2002) 4 RCLF 273
at 277 [Doucet, “L’égalite dans Lalonde et al c Commission”].
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others, as is particularly evident in the typical French translation for “substantive”
equality, “l’égalité réelle,” which literally means “real” equality.32 But despite the
popularity of this framing, it rests on a mirage.
Consider a standard version of this distinction. Te term “formal” equality
is often used to describe a principle requiring that the law have the same legal
efects on all individuals (sometimes described as “equality of treatment”), which
can be accomplished by prohibiting explicit distinctions based on some trait or
set of traits (sex, religious background, national origin, et cetera), distinctions
held to be morally odious. Formal equality is then contrasted with a rival
principle, according to which the law must produce the same practical efects
on all such groups. Te argument in favour of this rival principle is grounded
in the observation that the real-world situation of people can vary based on the
protected characteristics at issue; meaning that a right to equality of legal efects is
insufcient, since a facially neutral law can produce diferent practical outcomes
for the protected groups. In such cases, “true” equality requires that one examine
the benefts or costs of a legal measure from a broader perspective.33
Now, notice that the distinction does not truly rest on a premise that
there are diferent types of equality. Instead, it merely refects the fact that the
conceptual schema of equality can be populated in diferent ways. Te question
“equality of what?” has at least two answers: legal efects and practical efects.
Tese answers give rise to at least two possible principles of equality. However,
neither of these answers is inherently more or less appropriate as a response to the
relevant “what,” as both can be a proper basis for comparison, depending on the
circumstances. For example, when it was argued that denying women the right
to vote violated the principle of equality, the “what” referred to the legal efects
stricto sensu of the relevant laws, and equalizing these legal efects was precisely
the point of the remediation measures being sought. By contrast, when it is
argued that constructing a building without wheelchair access is discriminatory,
the “what” of interest is not the legal entitlement held by those in wheelchairs,
for they have precisely the same right to enter the building as any member of
the public. Instead, the argument rests on the diferential practical efects such
a design would have on their ability to exercise that right and enjoy its benefts.
Te underlying lesson here is that the formal–substantive dichotomy
cannot tell us which efect to be concerned about in any given case, because it
is a description and not an explanation. As a (rather crude) typology of equality
principles, it outlines some of the ways in which one could defne the scope of an
32. See generally Beaulac, supra note 16.
33. Ibid at para 22.

EASTAUGH, TOWARDS AN ACCOUNT OF LINGUISTIC EQUALITY 471

equality guarantee, but it does not contain within itself any reason for preferring
one over the other. Any argument grounded directly in that dichotomy begs the
very question at issue, namely, what value or interest does the equality guarantee
seek to protect? Even in contexts where the formal–substantive dichotomy
appears to do useful work, this is an illusion, for it does so merely as a vessel for
other principles. An apt illustration of this can be found in a relatively recent
article published in the Osgoode Hall Law Journal, in which Anthony Robert
Sangiuliano argues against “formal” equality and in favour of “substantive”
equality. Te overarching argument is framed in terms of the formal–substantive
dichotomy, and Sangiuliano purports to rest his analysis on the proposition that
these concepts have difering internal structures, one of which is superior to the
other as a framework for interpreting section 15 of the Charter.34 In practice,
however, neither formal nor substantive equality function as free-standing
concepts in his account. In explicating each concept, Sangiuliano outlines a
much broader set of normative assumptions that condition the equality analysis
and serve as the true basis for the distinction drawn between the two “types”
of equality.35 Tat is, rather than defning “equality” in the abstract, Sangiuliano
presents a theory of political morality according to which all individuals are
entitled to equality of recognition, which he argues should be used as a basis for
interpreting section 15.
To be clear, my aim here is not to criticize the substance of this account.
I merely use it to illustrate that, as Denise Réaume has noted, “an equality claim
does not directly appeal to equality itself as its foundation, but rather to some
other value implicated in the distribution of the beneft in issue.”36 Any particular
guarantee of equality, linguistic or otherwise, will necessarily be parasitic upon a
broader set of commitments. Tis broader set of commitments, like the axioms
of arithmetic in the example above, supply the constraints needed to make the
proposition fully intelligible. Tis is done by specifying the quality, the good,
34. “Substantive Equality as Equal Recognition: A New Teory of Section 15 of the Charter”
(2015) 52 Osgoode Hall LJ 601 at 606-607.
35. For example, Sangiuliano associates “formal equality” with a conceptual framework resting
on Dicey’s conception of “the rule of law,” and which rests (amongst other things) on the
premise that individual autonomy is the paramount value in political morality. See ibid at
627. He also defnes “substantive equality” as resting on a principle of equal recognition
holding that the law must not reproduce social hierarchies between certain groups. See
ibid at 609-10.
36. Denise Réaume, “Dignity, Equality, and Comparison” in Deborah Hellman & Sophia
Moreau, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press,
2013) 9 [Réaume, “Dignity, Equality, and Comparison”].
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or the social context in relation to which equality is to be measured:37 what may
be referred to as the “domain”38 or the “space”39 of equality.40 For ease of reference,
I shall henceforth refer to these as the axiomatic constraints of equality.
In a legal context, defning the axiomatic constraints of equality is, in the
frst instance at least, a matter of interpreting and applying the authoritative
legal texts.41 Equality guarantees do not speak of “equality” writ large, but rather
specify certain spheres of application. For example, section 15 of the Charter
speaks of equality “before and under the law” as well as “equal protection and
equal beneft of the law.”42 Tese terms set out, at least in part, the axiomatic
constraints of that particular guarantee. Of course, despite the presence of such
textual details, much of the necessary conceptual framework is missing or left up
to interpretation (for example, what is a “beneft?”), meaning that a great deal of
additional work is required before the guarantee can be applied to specifc cases—
and leaving ample room for disagreement. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to proceed
as though the central issue to be resolved is the structure of equality as a concept.

III. THE DETERMINANT ROLE OF PURPOSE
Now, this might strike some as a distinction without a diference. Even under
the formalistic defnition of equality outlined above, one will always need to
answer the question “equality of what?,” and accounts like the one I mentioned
above clearly aim to provide an answer to that question. Is this simply a matter
of terminology, and thus a mere “verbal controversy?”43 I do not believe so. Te
binary choice described above unnecessarily constrains the debate and ultimately
clouds the real issue. When the discussion is framed in these dichotomous terms,
one is led to assume that there are only two competing accounts of the norm at
37. Cf William B Grifth, “Equality and Egalitarianism: Framing the Contemporary Debate”
(1994) 7 Can JL & Jur 5 at 9; McLachlin, supra note 27 at 20.
38. Grifth, supra note 35 at 8.
39. Amartya Sen, Te Idea of Justice (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009) at 292.
40. See Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “Te Continual Reinvention of Section
15 of the Charter” (2013) 64 UNBLJ 19 at 22; Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia,
[1989] 1 SCR 143 at 170 [Andrews] (both on the role of wording in defning the domain of
section 15 equality rights).
41. In purely philosophical accounts, which are not subject to any authoritative sources, the
axiomatic constraints of equality are typically supplied by the principles of some broader
account of political morality.
42. Supra note 1, s 15.
43. Cf Glanville Williams, ed, Salmond on Jurisprudence, 11th ed (Sweet & Maxwell,
1957) at 264-65.
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issue, when there may in reality be a much greater range of possibilities. Tis can
hamper one’s understanding of what is truly at stake in any given case.
Consider for example the SCC’s decision in DesRochers v Canada (Industry),44
one of the leading cases on the defnition of linguistic equality. At issue in this
case was whether a community economic development program, the purpose of
which was to fund local business ventures, had been implemented in a manner
consistent with the federal government’s duty to provide services of equal quality
in both English and French. Te crux of the problem was that, despite being able
to communicate in French, Industry Canada’s local third-party service provider
had failed to develop a single project with a French-speaking business person.45
According to the plaintif, this was because the local service model was designed
entirely by and for members of the linguistic majority and so did not account
for signifcant sociocultural diferences between the two communities, leading
to a disconnect between the methods, needs, and interests of the francophone
business community and the program ofered by Industry Canada.46 Te plaintif
argued that the principle of equality undergirding section 20 of the Charter and
Part IV of the Ofcial Languages Act required Industry Canada to take these
sociocultural diferences into account, and thus to develop and fund a diferent
44. 2009 SCC 8 [DesRochers SCC].
45. In fact, the third-party provider retained by Industry Canada initially failed to ofer even
the most basic of services in French for it had no staf capable of communicating in that
language. As a result, leading members of the local francophone community set up their own
independently funded economic development agency, known as CALDECH. Eventually,
having been made aware of its failure, Industry Canada agreed to fund CALDECH on
an interim basis while it made changes to its program. However, these changes proved
insufcient, and CALDECH’s backers felt that Industry Canada’s third-party provider
remained insensitive to the needs of the francophone community. CALDECH therefore
initiated proceedings under the Charter and the OLA, asking that Industry Canada be
ordered to provide it with a stable revenue stream as the de facto service provider to the
francophone population, and that it be compensated for services rendered during the years
before Industry Canada had agreed to fund it on an interim basis. See Desrochers v Canada
(Industry), 2005 FC 987 [Desrochers FC].
46. Ibid. Te plaintifs’ basic factual allegations, which were efectively accepted by Industry
Canada, were as follows:
Te French from the Huronia region are diferent than the English majority because, inter
alia, they: (i) have less economic power in the region; (ii) have fewer jobs and a higher
unemployment rate; (iii) have fewer institutions that are their own and are less likely to live
in their mother tongue; (iv) are less likely to work in their mother tongue; (v) are subject to
a rate of assimilation of more than 67%; (vi) live in a region where historically Francophones
have been persecuted; and (vii) have a culture which is diferent. Accordingly, in terms of
community economic development, the needs of the French in the Huronia region are
diferent than those of their English peers (ibid at para 64).
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(and administratively distinct) delivery model for the francophone community in
the relevant region. Te lower courts, siding with the government, ruled that the
status quo did not constitute a violation of section 20 of the Charter because the
latter guaranteed only “equal linguistic access to regional economic development
services” and not “access to equal … services.”47
Te lawyers for the plaintif and for the Commissioner of Ofcial Languages
presented the issue as a clash between formal and substantive conceptions of
linguistic equality.48 Tis is understandable given that, on the facts of the case,
doing so ofered them a tactical advantage. Te specifc issue before the Court was
whether the references to “language” in the relevant statutory and constitutional
provisions were meant to denote English and French in their capacity as a means
of communication, or instead referred to a broader set of factors or interests that
would include the functional quality of the service at issue.49 Tus, one could
plausibly spin the key question as being whether to adopt a “broad” or a “narrow”
interpretation of the right. In that context, the formal–substantive dichotomy
can be a powerful ally, since formal equality is generically thought of as narrow,
while substantive equality is instead broad or generous. Moreover, formal equality
has acquired a fairly strong pejorative connotation,50 especially in relation to
language rights,51 and so the term can be used as a rhetorical device to push the
courts or other decision makers towards the broadest available interpretation of
a given right (i.e., the one that views the right as protecting the broadest range of
interests), particularly in novel cases where the interest being asserted has yet to
be formally recognized, as was the case in DesRochers.
47. Desrochers v Canada (Industry), 2006 FCA 374 at paras 33-34 [Desrochers FCA].
48. Ibid at para 36.
49. Érik Labelle Eastaugh, “Te Concept of a Linguistic Community” (2018) 69 UTLJ
117 [Labelle Eastaugh, “Te Concept of a Linguistic Community”]. As Érik Labelle
Eastaugh has noted:
Te reference to “language” in [language rights provisions] is ambiguous because language,
as a phenomenon, has at least two major dimensions, each of which has diferent implications
for the meaning [of such provisions]. On the one hand, a language is a code comprised of
arbitrary symbols, whose purpose we might describe, after sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, as being
to satisfy the “technical requirements of communication.” It is, in other words, a mechanism
for recording and transmitting information. On the other hand, natural languages are a central
feature of human society, arguably the most important one. In multilingual societies, they will
often be a defning trait of the general social structure (ibid at 142).

50. For instance, in Andrews, Justice McIntyre compared it to the Nuremburg laws and the
doctrine of “separate but equal” under which Jim Crow laws were upheld as constitutional in
the United States. Andrews, supra note 38 at 166.
51. See generally Beaulac, supra note 16.
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However, neither of the proposed interpretations in DesRochers was inherently
“formal” or “substantive,” meaning that this distinction could not really settle the
issue. Te notion that “language” denotes that a means of communication may
have been “narrow,” and thus “formal,” in the context of that case, but this is not
always true. Consider, for example, the now notorious decisions of the SCC in
the 1986 language rights trilogy (the Trilogy), in which the Court held that the
right to use English or French in a courtroom guaranteed by section 133 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 (CA 1867), section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870 (MA
1870), and section 19(2) of the Charter (all of which were held to be functionally
equivalent and therefore requiring the same interpretation) does not carry with
it a correlative right to be understood or addressed in that language by the court.52
Tis decision is often framed as a triumph of formalism over substance, and
rightly so.53 But for this very reason, it undercuts the formal–substantive framing
used in Beaulac. In those cases, a reading based on the premise that both English
and French must be of equal utility as a means of communication—like that
proposed in dissent by Justice Wilson—would be “substantive” rather than
“formal.” Tus, the notion that language rights protect the ability to communicate
cannot simply be labelled as either formal or substantive, and whether it results
in a broad or narrow reading of the right will depend entirely upon the context
of the case at hand.54
Te larger lesson here is that the axiomatic constraints of equality can only
be settled by defning the underlying purpose of the measure at issue; arguing
that the matter can be settled by resorting to the formal–substantive dichotomy is
mostly a distraction. Te Trilogy gave rise to two rival interpretations of sections
133, 23, and 19(2) because two diferent purposes were proposed for these
provisions, carrying with them diferent implications as to “what” needed to be
equalized in order for the right to be respected. Te majority’s view was that the
52. MacDonald, supra note 9; Société des Acadiens, supra note 9; Bilodeau, supra note 9.
53. Te majority’s reasoning in these cases have been thoroughly criticized (and essentially
overturned), and I will not rehearse the litany of problems with it here. See generally Beaulac,
supra note 16; Denise Réaume, “Demise of the Political Compromise Doctrine: Have
Ofcial Language Use Rights Been Revived?” (2001) 47 McGill LJ 593.
54. See MacDonald, supra note 9, Wilson J, dissenting. In fact, it is impossible to neatly
distinguish between Justice Wilson’s reading and the majority’s reading on the basis of
their relative “breadth.” While it is true that the rights of a private party were defned more
narrowly by the majority than by Justice Wilson, the rights at issue were extended to a larger
number of people, given that, under Justice Wilson’s interpretation, representatives of the
state, including judges, would have been excluded from any protections, as the state would
have been held to be the subject of the guarantees at issue. One could therefore plausibly
argue that both readings are “broad” or “narrow” depending on one’s frame of reference.
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purpose of these measures was simply to prevent the state from prohibiting the use
of English or French in a judicial context, something which had been attempted
under the Act of Union, 1840, the immediate predecessor to the Constitution Act,
1867, as well as in the frst version of Quebec’s Charter of the French Language.55
For Justice Wilson, by contrast,56 the purpose was rather to ensure equal access
to legislative and judicial institutions for both language groups, meaning that
each set of public bodies was required to be able to function in both languages
on an institutional level. Later decisions adhere to the same pattern, even if they
do (generally) exhibit a richer understanding of the relevant interests than the
majority reasons in the Trilogy. For example, while the SCC ultimately overturned
the lower courts’ holding in DesRochers that equality under section 20 of the
Charter applies only to communication and not to the quality of public services,
its reasoning did not rely on the formal–substantive dichotomy, but rather on its
conclusions about the purpose of the measures at issue.57 Even in Beaulac, which
explicitly used the vocabulary of “substantive equality,” the Court’s ultimate
conclusion with respect to interpretation was stated in similar terms: “Language
rights must in all cases be interpreted purposively.”58 It is therefore preferable to
focus one’s analytical eforts on the broader interpretive matrix of the provision
at issue, rather than attempting to shoehorn the issue at hand into the formal–
substantive dichotomy.

IV. THE BASIS FOR A UNIFIED THEORY OF LINGUISTIC
EQUALITY
Of course, grounding the analysis in the purpose of the specifc measure at issue,
rather than the (putatively) archetypal formal–substantive dichotomy, might give
rise to a diferent problem. Unlike general equality rights, which are typically
55. Quebec (AG) v Blaikie et al, [1979] 2 SCR 1016.
56. Chief Justice Dickson espoused similar views with respect to section 19(2) of the Charter
(but not section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867). See Société des Acadiens, supra note 9 at
564-65. For Justice Wilson’s view, see MacDonald, supra note 9 at 537-38.
57. Te court efectively held that in cases where, given the nature of the service, sociocultural
diferences between the two language groups stand to have an impact on service delivery
and efectiveness, the minority is entitled to a parallel development and delivery process,
as federal institutions have a duty to “take the necessary steps to ensure that Francophones
are considered equal partners with Anglophones… [in the] defnition… and in the provision of
equal economic development services.” DesRochers SCC, supra note 42 at para 28 [emphasis
in original]. A policy tailored to the needs of the majority and ofered to the minority
through bilingual staf and translated materials would likely violate the principle of equality.
58. Beaulac, supra note 16 at para 25 [emphasis in original].
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contained in a single overarching provision, measures protecting linguistic
equality are numerous and often quite detailed.59 If the axiomatic constraints of
an equality guarantee are defned by its specifc purpose, then perhaps there is a
myriad of distinct conceptions of linguistic equality tied to the particulars of each
language rights provision. Tis in turn could make it impossible to capture them
all using a single concept, and therefore doom any attempt to use such a concept
as the basis for a general theoretical account.
Fortunately, the case law dealing with the interpretation of language rights
suggests that this is a manageable problem. Language rights measures pertaining
to English and French have been deemed by the courts to form a unifed feld for
the purposes of interpretation. As a result, the courts have developed a specialized
59. Language rights measures pertaining to English and French are found in a very wide array
of legal instruments adopted at both the federal and provincial levels. Strictly speaking,
only some of these measures can properly be described as relating to the matter of “ofcial
languages” in the constitutional sense: sections 16 to 22 of the Charter, the federal Ofcial
Languages Act (which implements and further specifes the latter), the Ofcial Languages
Act of New Brunswick (which does the same), as well as the Ofcial Languages Act of
the Northwest Territories and of Nunavut and the Languages Act of the Yukon (which,
as creatures of federal statutory law, are likely subject to sections 16 to 22 of the Charter).
Section 23 of the Charter, while obviously connected to sections 16 to 22, does not employ
the concept of an “ofcial language” and is placed in a separate part, perhaps because it
applies primarily to provinces. Similarly, neither section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867,
which regulates the use of English and French before Parliament and federal courts, as well
as the Legislature and courts of Quebec, nor section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, which
extends the same principle to Manitoba, employ the term “ofcial.” In addition to these
constitutional or constitutionally mandated measures, a number of important provincial
statutes dealing with the relative status and rights of anglophones and francophones have
also been enacted, most notably the French Language Services Act of Ontario (FLSA) and the
Charter of the French Language of Quebec (CFL). Te former recognizes English and French
as “ofcial” languages of Ontario with respect to education and the courts and provides fairly
generous rights to francophones with respect to the legislative process, public services, and
municipalities. However, unlike the federal Ofcial Languages Act, it does not represent an
implementation of constitutionally guaranteed rights. Te CFL, for its part, declares French
to be the sole “ofcial” language of Quebec and generally aims to make it the exclusive
language of the provincial state apparatus. However, its efects are limited by the scope of
section 133 of the CA 1867 and section 23 of the Charter, and it does recognize a number
of language rights for non-francophones, in particular anglophones. Like the FLSA, the CFL
is not directly connected to any constitutionally guaranteed language rights (except with
respect to its provisions on the language of education, as well as freedom of expression, which
one could include under that general rubric). However, as I explain below, the courts have
tended to treat all of these instruments (with the exception of the CFL, which is something
of an edge case) as belonging to the same general category of measures, despite their
apparent diversity.
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set of interpretive principles that apply to these rights as a category. Tese
principles do not depart from the standard canons of constitutional or statutory
interpretation, but rather stipulate how to populate some of the variables one
is required to consider under the latter, such as the purpose of the measure for
interpretive ends.60 As a result, a single concept of linguistic equality is presumed
to underpin all constitutional and statutory provisions dealing with ofcial
languages. Legislative measures dealing with language rights are generally to be
understood either as instantiations of the general guarantee set out in sections
16(1) and 16(2) of the Charter (which provide that English and French shall
enjoy “equality of status and equality of rights and privileges” at the federal level
and in New Brunswick, respectively) or as an exercise of the power granted by
section 16(3) (which authorises Parliament and the provincial legislatures “to
advance the equality of status or use of English and French”).61 In other words,
sections 16(1)–(3) of the Charter serve as the nexus and fountainhead of what is
presumed to be a conceptually coherent scheme embracing both constitutional
and statutory law. Tis scheme extends to language rights granted elsewhere in the
Constitution, outside the Charter’s section on “ofcial languages” (section 133 of
the CA 1867, section 23 of the MA 1870, and section 23 of the Charter)62 as well
as under provincial legislation not directly anchored in any constitutional right.63
60. See e.g. Charlebois v Saint John (City), 2005 SCC 74 at para 23.
61. According to Beaulac, language rights must “in all cases” be interpreted using the same
general principles. Beaulac, supra note 16 at para 25 [emphasis in original]. Tis proposition
was anchored primarily in sections 16(1) and 16(3) of the Charter. Legislative measures
dealing with language rights at the federal level are to be understood either as instantiations
of the general guarantee set out in section 16(1) (and further specifed in sections 17(1),
18(1), 19(1) and 20(1) of the Charter) or as an exercise of the legislative authority conferred
by subsection 16(3). Te same is true of legislation in New Brunswick, which is subject to a
parallel scheme set out in sections 16(2), 16.1, 17(2), 18(2), 19(2) and 20(2) of the Charter.
See Charlebois v Mowat et ville de Moncton, 2001 NBCA 117 at paras 62-63 [Charlebois].
62. Section 133 of the Constitution Act 1867, section 23 of the Manitoba Act 1870, and section
23 of the Charter, though falling outside the scheme of “ofcial languages” set out in sections
16 to 20 of the Charter, have been deemed to rest on the same general principle of linguistic
equality as the those in the Charter. Beaulac, supra note 16 at paras 16-24.
63. Legislation conferring language rights in provinces other than New Brunswick is to be viewed
as an exercise of the section 16(3) authority, with the exception of matters falling under some
other constitutional guarantee, such as section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867; section 23
of the Manitoba Act, 1870; and section 23 of the Charter. See for example Lalonde, supra
note 2 at paras 128-39 (regarding the French Language Services Act of Ontario); CL v Quebec
(Société de l’assurance automobile), 2014 QCTA 2386 (Tribunal Adminsitratif du Québec)
at paras 28-36 (regarding the Charter of the French Language). Contra the last decision, see
Odeh v Québec (Ministère de l’Éducation) (Comité d’examen sur la langue d’enseignement),
2005 QCCA 670 at para 46 (which held that the principles set out in Beaulac do not apply
to the Charter of the French Language). Te latter is thus something of an edge case for
the time being.
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In light of the presumed conceptual coherence of language rights,
developing a unifed theory of linguistic equality seems both possible and
worthwhile. However, such a theory must be able to accommodate and account
for the somewhat complicated structure of the ofcial language rights system.
Tis requires that two points be addressed. First, the content of the central
unifying principle needs to be defned. Second, its relationship to the specifcs of
particular language rights provisions must be clarifed. For even if we assume that
all language rights measures participate in a general project of linguistic equality,
their individual functions will necessarily be limited in scope. We therefore need
some way to articulate the specifc burden they bear. In order to distinguish
between these two levels of analysis, I will refer to them as generic and special
linguistic equality, respectively.
In the balance of this article, I will attempt to articulate the analytical
relationship between these two concepts of linguistic equality, as well as propose
a preliminary account of the former. My overall approach is heavily inspired
by Réaume’s account of the analytical structure of general equality rights, with
some modifcations needed to accommodate the added complexity of the ofcial
language rights system. For the sake of clarity, I will begin by summarizing
Réaume’s account, and then explain how it can be adapted to serve our needs here.

V. THE ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE OF LINGUISTIC EQUALITY
As I noted above, Réaume argues that equality rights do not protect an interest in
equality, as such. Instead, they are concerned with protecting some other interest
that is presumed to be distributed equally.64 Te point of such rights is not to
enforce a rule of egalitarianism for its own sake, but rather to ensure that the
interest in the underlying good is respected. While a comparison of the claimant’s
situation to that of some other group is central to the analytical structure of the
right, it functions solely as a means for determining whether (and to what extent)
the interest at issue has been infringed.65 Tus, on Réaume’s account, the true role

64. Réaume, “Dignity, Equality, and Comparison,” supra note 36 at 8-9.
65. Réaume argues that the remedies typically sought for an equality rights breach make this
clear. Claimants in such cases never seek a levelling-down of the entitlement created by the
legislation; instead, they ask for a levelling-up, i.e., to be included in a scheme from which,
they assert, they have been wrongly excluded. Tis suggests that the interest that concerns
them is not truly based in egalitarianism as a free-standing value. A claim solely predicated on
such an interest would be indiferent as between levelling-up and levelling-down, since both
would produce “equality” from a conceptual standpoint. Te fact that equality rights are not
viewed in this way indicates that the underlying value is not egalitarianism as such, and that
something else is going on. Ibid.
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of an equality guarantee is to “police” the distributive functions of the state from
the vantage point of this equally distributed interest.66
However, this policing function is not operative in all circumstances.
Instead, its availability depends on the nature of the contested measure and its
relationship to the interest underpinning the equality guarantee. As Réaume
points out, most of what the state does is distribute costs and benefts.67 Any
particular act of distribution by the state, whether in the form of legislation or
administrative practice, will be based on criteria which instantiates an underlying
principle of distribution, i.e., a principle defning who is entitled to the benefts
or can be made to bear the costs. Tis will typically be done in order to create or
secure a particular good in furtherance of some human interest.68 Yet a person
making an equality claim asserts that a wider distribution of this particular good
is required by the equality provision.69 Such a claim implies that there is some
connection or overlap between the specifc human interest advanced by the act
of distribution, on the one hand, and the more general interest underpinning
the equality guarantee, on the other. More specifcally, it implies that the specifc
distribution at issue is “justiciable” in the name of the underpinning interest.70
For example, suppose that the right to equality rests on the premise that all
individuals possess equal dignity. Suppose also that some benefts provided by the
state, like health care, can be viewed as “dignity-constituting,” in the sense that
their purpose is (at least in part) to secure or refect the inherent dignity of every
individual. From that perspective, one could use the principle of equal dignity as
a basis for evaluating the state’s distribution of health care benefts.71 However,
66. Ibid at 10-13.
67. As I understand the argument, Réaume takes this to include not only straightforwardly
economic costs and benefts, but any form of advantage or disadvantage, including
punishment, social status, or autonomy.
68. Réaume, “Dignity, Equality, and Comparison,” supra note 34 at 10. Réaume explains that:
We all have an interest in security from physical sufering, both because pain is itself bad and
because some forms of sufering can curtail one’s ability to pursue one’s important projects
in life, which ability is an independent good. Tese interests may ground provision of health
care based on need or fair access to work opportunities so we can feed and shelter ourselves,
and many other concrete goods and benefts besides. Each of these distributive principles
is ultimately grounded in the interest in freedom from sufering. Tat is to say, when these
concrete goods are provided, it is because they serve this interest (or one like it).

69. Ibid at 11.
70. Réaume goes on to outline some of the reasons why they think the concept of dignity can
fulfll this role, given that the dignity interest often plays a role in motivating the state’s
choices regarding the distribution of benefts and burdens. Ibid at 12-13, 19-21.
71. Ibid at 12-13.
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benefts that have no relation to human dignity, or principles of distribution that
have no efect on it, would not be subject to such review.
Tus, in Réaume’s account, a valid equality claim rests on the interaction
between two distributive principles, with one (general equality) being used to
discipline the other (the contested act of distribution). As I will illustrate below,
the basic elements of this account can be repurposed to explain the analytical
relationship between generic and special linguistic equality. However, in order to
do so, we must add a third component to the analysis, because, unlike general
equality rights, which arise from the interaction of two main components (the
equality guarantee and the act of distribution), language rights claims involve
three components: (1) the principle of generic linguistic equality, (2) the specifc
language right at issue (which embodies a principle of special linguistic equality),
and (3) a further act of distribution, such as a piece of legislation or an instance of
administrative practice that is subject to review on the basis of that right. As a result,
there are two potential levels of analysis in any given case: (1) the interaction
between the particular language right at issue and the contested measure, which
involves a claim to special linguistic equality; and (2) the interaction between the
general principle of linguistic equality and the proposed defnition of the specifc
right involved, which involves a claim to generic linguistic equality. At the level
of special linguistic equality (level 1), a particular language right can be used
to “police” the distributive choices of the state from the vantage point of the
principle of distribution it is intended to capture, such as linguistic equality in
public services (e.g., section 20 of the Charter). Tis must be done while keeping
in mind the particular limits on the function of the language right at issue (i.e.,
the specifc subset of interests it is meant to protect). At the same time, any
proposed defnition of the distributive principle embedded in that right is subject
to review on the basis of generic linguistic equality (level 2). Most language rights
are broadly worded, and so there is likely to be more than one possible account
of the distributive principle instantiated in any given right. Te primary role of
generic linguistic equality is to guide the choices made in this regard by providing
one or more general principles that can discipline the interpretation of particular
language rights measures.
Te workings of the model I am proposing can be illustrated using the
reasons in Mahe v Alberta, where the SCC frst set out its general interpretive
framework for section 23 of the Charter.72 Te specifc issue in that case was
72. See Mahe, supra note 2. For a much more detailed analysis of the conceptual
architecture of Mahe, see generally Labelle Eastaugh, “Te Concept of a Linguistic
Community,” supra note 47.
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whether or not section 23 provides parents with a collective right to “management
and control” over schools operating under the auspices of that provision.73
In order to answer this question, the Court needed to address the role of equality
in defning section 23 rights. But rather than begin its analysis by considering
the particulars of the education context, it approached the issue from a much
higher level of abstraction and made a number of broad theoretical statements
about the purpose of the ofcial language rights system as a whole. For instance,
the Court noted that this system was intended to “give efect to the concept of
an ‘equal partnership’” between the two language groups,74 a partnership which
was held to rest on certain basic principles, such as the premise that “any broad
guarantee of language rights … cannot be separated from a concern for the culture
associated with the language,” because “[l]anguage is more than a mere means of
communication, it is part and parcel of the identity and culture of the people
speaking it.”75 Only after having set out these premises (which relate to what I am
calling the principles of generic linguistic equality) did the Court defne the more
specifc right to educational equality found in section 23, holding that the latter
in fact serves to instantiate these broader principles.76 Tis more narrowly tailored
concept of equality (which is an instance of special linguistic equality) was then
used as the basic frame of reference for interpreting section 23’s history and text,77

73. Sub-section 23(3)(b) of the Charter confers a right on members of the French or English
minority (depending on the province) to have their children receive “instruction in minority
language educational facilities.” See Mahe, supra note 2 at 345. Te parents argued that
this right to “facilities” included not only a right to separate schools, but also a right to
administer these schools collectively through a distinct school board which would enjoy a
degree of control over the content of the curriculum. Te provincial government, for its
part, maintained that section s 23 deals merely with language as the medium of instruction,
that it imposed no constraints on provincial powers to defne the content of the curriculum,
and that the word “facilities” denoted nothing more than a separate physical structure and
implied no rights over school governance (See ibid). See Mahe, supra note 2
74. Ibid at 364.
75. Ibid at 362.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid at 368-73. Ultimately, the Court held that section 23 does indeed provide parents with
a right to management and control, as this was necessary to respect the general principles on
which it rests. In particular, such a right is “vital to ensure that [the] language and culture
fourish. … [B]ecause a variety of management issues in education, e.g., curricula, hiring
and expenditures, can afect linguistic and cultural concerns,” and “the majority cannot be
expected to understand and appreciate all of the diverse ways in which educational practices
may infuence the language and culture of the minority” (ibid at 372).
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which in turn was used to police the distributive measure at issue, namely the
provisions of the School Act that allocated powers over school management.78
Distinguishing between these two levels of analysis clarifes the central issues
at stake in this case, as well as the extent of the its relevance to other language
rights contexts. On one level, the claimants contested the province’s narrow
interpretation of section 23 rights, on the grounds that it was incompatible with
the basic premises of all ofcial language rights. Tis aspect of the case is primarily
concerned with two things: (1) the way in which the overarching relationship
between the two language groups—and their relative places in Canadian
society—ought to be conceived; and (2) how this relationship should inform our
understanding of the interests protected by section 23. Statements made on this
level of analysis are thus likely to be applicable to all language rights, as evidenced
by the frequency with which the relevant passages from Mahe are cited by the
courts when dealing with otherwise unrelated provisions.79 On a diferent level,
however, the claimants were also contesting the details of the province’s school
management structure, on the grounds that it was incompatible with their specifc
interest in educational equality. Tis claim involved a more detailed consideration
of the principles that ought to govern school administration and the specifcs of
the impugned legislation. Such principles are bound to be more idiosyncratic
than those of generic linguistic equality, and so their applicability outside the
education context cannot be assumed, even though, as an application of generic
linguistic equality, they may nonetheless be relevant. Tus, while the section 23
case law has consistently held that the attainment of educational equality requires
the provision of educational services through a distinct set of siloed institutions

78. School Act, RSA 1980 ch S-3, as repealed by School Act, RSA 2000, c S-3.
79. See e.g. Beaulac, supra note 16 at paras 18-24; Lalonde, supra note 2 at paras 134-35;
Charlebois, supra note 61 at paras 28, 50; Fédération Franco‑Ténoise v Canada (AG), 2006
NWTSC 20 at paras 112-13 (overturned in part on other grounds in 2008 NWTCA 5).
In fact, through Beaulac, which immediately became the leading case on language rights
interpretation, these aspects of Mahe have infuenced a whole generation of court rulings.
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under the management and control of the language minority (administrative
duality), this may or may not be required in other contexts.80

VI. GENERIC LINGUISTIC EQUALITY
A. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

Having described what I take to be the analytical relationship between the
concepts of generic and special linguistic equality, there remains of course the
question of their substantive content—by which I mean the specifc principles
of distribution that operate on each level. Defning these principles will be
challenging, and not merely because each kind of language right (e.g., education,
services, judicial process, employment, et cetera) protects a somewhat diferent
subset of interests. As Réaume has noted, the distributive context in which
equality claims are made places the courts in a difcult position. One of the
primary aims of democratic governance is to allow the people to deliberate on the
distributive principles that should govern state action, and legislators are elected
based on their views on such matters. If an equality right were formulated so
vaguely as to enable one to challenge any distributive choice, this would require
the courts to comprehensively substitute their judgment for that of elected
representatives, which they are likely to resist doing.81 It is therefore imperative
to articulate the nature of the distributive principles in a way that is “tolerably
plain.”82 Accordingly, “[t]he task of a theory of discrimination law, or any other

80. Te possibility that such a model may be required is implicit in the SCC’s ruling in
DesRochers SCC, as well as the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Lalonde. See DesRocher
SCC, supra note 42; Lalonde, supra note 2. In that connection, it is interesting to note that
New Brunswick has largely imposed a system of administrative duality on its health care
system, while Ontario has incorporated a substantial degree of mandatory francophone
participation in the policy development process. For New Brunswick, see Regional Health
Authorities Act, RSNB 2011, c 217, ss 15-19. For Ontario, see Ministry of Health and
Long‑Term Care Act, RSO 1990, c M.26, s 8.1(2); Local Health System Integration Act,
SO 2006, c 4, s 16(4)(b); O Reg 515/09; and Connecting Care Act, 2019, SO 2019, c 5,
Schedule 1, s 44(2)(b). Ontario is in the process of restructuring its health care system but I
am aware of no plans to abolish the French-language health planning entities created under
the Local Health System Integration Act, 2006. For a study of language rights in the Ontario
healthcare system, see: Érik Labelle Eastaugh, “L’application de la Loi sur les services en
français (LSF) de l’Ontario aux services de santé : la problématique des Réseaux locaux
d’intégration des soins de santé (RLISS)” (2019) 49 RGD 357.
81. See Réaume, “Dignity, Equality, and Comparison,” supra note 34 at 11-12.
82. Ibid at 12.
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area of human rights law, is to sketch the process whereby such abstract concepts
are brought down to earth in a sufciently fne-grained way to help decide cases.”83
When attempting to develop a theory that accounts for an existing body of
law, one should begin by excavating, and if necessary clarifying, the “patterns of
normative understanding” already present in the primary legal sources.84 Existing
norms and principles must be identifed and described, including those that
may simply be implicit in the general scheme of legislative action and judicial
decision-making. Tese patterns will supply a number of “fxed points” that defne
or at least constrain the scope of the legally possible.85 However, one must also be
mindful that the meaning of juridical concepts depends in part on extra-juridical
notions, and that the boundary between legal and moral discourse is somewhat
porous.86 A complete account of linguistic equality should therefore endeavour
to make sense of the moral intuitions refected in the “patterns of normative
understanding,” and to fll any conceptual gaps where issues of fundamental
importance are left unresolved. It should, in other words, include an account of
why linguistic equality, as a legal norm, is morally justifed.
However, as I noted at the outset, my focus here is on developing a model
of the patterns expressed in the primary legal sources, as this analytical task takes
place prior to a consideration of extra-legal moral concepts. In truth, even this
more limited goal is too ambitious to be achieved in a single article, but some
progress can be made here. Tat being said, in the fnal Part of this article (Part
VI, below), I will briefy explore some of the challenges involved in expanding
the account to include the question of moral foundations, and will ofer some
preliminary thoughts on how linguistic equality might relate to other principles
of equality recognized in the Constitution.
B. TWO PRINCIPLES OF GENERIC LINGUISTIC EQUALITY

Drawing on the leading cases and related sources (like the reports of the Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism), as well as scholarly analysis,
I have attempted to formulate a set of distributive principles that describe the
content of generic linguistic equality. I will explain these principles below—as
well as my reasoning in arriving at them—but I will frst summarize all three.
My proposal involves two interlocking principles, and one corollary.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Ibid at 21.
McCrudden, supra note 19 at 634.
See Alexy, supra note 21 at 48.
Bamforth, supra note 23 at 171.
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Te frst principle is individual linguistic equality: the state must distribute
costs and benefts in a way that respects the right of members of each ofcial
language community to pursue their conception of a good life without having to
abandon, or be disadvantaged by, their community of origin.
Te second principle is collective linguistic equality: the state must distribute
costs and benefts in a way that respects the right of the two ofcial language
communities, understood as collective entities, to exist and fourish.
Te corollary is the state has a duty to provide somewhat greater benefts,
or impose somewhat lower costs, on the French-language community because of
the history of unfair treatment it has sufered.
I describe the frst two principles as “interlocking” because, as I will explain
further below, there is signifcant evidence that individual linguistic equality
depends upon collective linguistic equality. In addition, the corollary interlocks
with the frst two principles in that it holds true merely to the extent that
individuals and communities continue to bear costs resulting from past violations
of those principles in the present day.87
1.

INDIVIDUAL LINGUISTIC EQUALITY

In seeking to uncover the patterns of normative understanding in the ofcial
language rights system, the most logical place to start is the work of the Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the Commission), whose reports
established the basic parameters of the post-1969 system of ofcial language
rights. Tese reports have been repeatedly cited by the courts and generally
hang in the background of any discussion of the ofcial language rights system,
whether or not they are explicitly mentioned. Of particular interest here is the
fact that the Commission explored the concept of equality in its famous “blue
pages,” which set out a coherent theoretical framework for its constitutional and
legislative proposals. Tis framework is considerably more comprehensive than
anything ofered by the courts directly and is therefore a useful guide to how the
components of the ofcial language rights system ft together.
Two things in particular stand out from the Commission’s views on equality.
First, it understood its mandate (and thus the purpose of the measures it would
propose) as extending beyond the basic human rights enshrined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Canadian Bill of Rights. Tough it believed
that a denial of these rights along linguistic lines would constitute a breach of
equality and would therefore be wrongful, it noted that this was not a common
87. See e.g. Association des parents de l’école Rose‑des‑vents v British Columbia (Education), 2015
SCC 21 at para 32 [Association des parents de l’école Rose‑des‑vents].
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occurrence in Canada and concluded that its role was to explore how to extend
the realm of equality beyond this point.88 Second, the Commission felt compelled
to examine equality at both an individual and a collective level.89
I will return to the Commission’s concept of collective linguistic equality in
dealing with the second principle. For now, I wish to highlight the way in which
it described individual linguistic equality. In the Commission’s view, such equality
exists only if the individual is “able to fnd, at all levels of human activity, a setting
which will permit [them] to develop, to express [themselves], and to create in
accordance with [their] own culture.”90 Such equality can only be attained if
“everybody has the same access to the various benefts of a society without being
hindered by [their] cultural identity.”91 According to the Commission, this cannot
be achieved through traditional rules of non-discrimination alone. In order to
be equal, individuals must have the ability to engage as full members of society
without needing to renounce their cultural traits—i.e., without needing to adopt
those of another group. Tis requires that the focus be shifted away from the
individual and towards social institutions, as these are the portals through which
one enters society and thus mediate one’s interactions with it:92
Social relationships, particularly in the world of labour, in consumer life, and
in political life, are increasingly shaped by social institutions which, so to speak,
interpose themselves between individuals and impose on them a certain pattern
of action. Interpersonal and intergroup relations, therefore, are often the result of
institutional structures which mesh like the gears of a social mechanism to bring
groups into contact.

Tus, in order to be able to engage with society on an equal footing, i.e., without
being disadvantaged by their linguistic community of origin, members of each
group must have ready access to the institutions of society in their own language.
Tis institutional conception of individual linguistic equality, frst articulated
by the Commission, is present throughout the case law dealing with language
rights. For instance, it appears in Justice Wilson’s infuential dissenting reasons
in the Trilogy, where she argued that the purpose of section 133 of the CA 1867,
section 23 of the MA 1870, and section 19 of the Charter was to impose an
88. See Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Report of the Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Book I: Te Ofcial Languages (Queen’s
Printer, 1967) (A Davidson Dunton & André Laurendeau) at xl [Report on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism].
89. See ibid at xl-xliii.
90. Ibid at xli.
91. Ibid at xl.
92. Ibid at xl-xli.
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obligation on the judiciary, as an institution, to ensure that francophones and
anglophones could access the courts on an equal footing. It was later adopted by a
majority of the SCC in Beaulac, which held that, in order to respect the principle
of linguistic equality, “the exercise of language rights must not be considered
exceptional, or as something in the nature of a request for an accommodation,”
but rather the norm.93 One implication of this is that, in circumstances where an
institution is required to provide services in both languages, there is an obligation
to put in place the “institutional infrastructure” needed to provide both services
“on an equal basis,” with no regard to “administrative inconvenience” or cost.94
Te institutional conception can also be seen at work in the DesRochers
Court’s rejection of the argument that section 20 of the Charter merely protects
equality in relation to the “linguistic” aspect of a service, and not its content.95
In efect, the Court held that the substantive public good which is the subject
of a language right must be provided to the linguistic minority on equal terms
with the linguistic majority. As a practical matter, this means that the service
provided to the minority cannot be developed simply as a post hoc extension of
a chronologically or conceptually prior version of the policy designed using the
majority as the paradigm case. In situations where, given the nature of the service,
sociocultural diferences between the two groups stand to have an impact on service
delivery and efectiveness, the minority is entitled to a parallel development and
delivery process, as federal institutions have a duty to “‘take the necessary steps to
ensure that [f ]rancophones are considered equal partners with [a]nglophones’ in
the defnition and provision of economic development services.”96
Te institutional conception is also quite clearly present in the case law
dealing with education rights. On one level, this is quite obvious: education
rights are explicitly designed to impose an obligation to create or redesign
institutional structures. However, such a right need not rest on the principle of
individual linguistic equality outlined above. Consider for example the views
expressed by the United States Supreme Court (USSC) in Lau v Nichols.97 In that
case, the USSC held that 1,800 Chinese-speaking children with little knowledge
of English could not be compelled to enroll in an English-only public education
system and that some measure of special accommodation—which might include
bilingual education—was required. In efect, the US Court stated that these
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Beaulac, supra note 16 at para 24.
Ibid at para 39.
Desrochers SCC, supra note 44. See also note 57.
DesRochers SCC, supra note 42 at para 54.
414 US 563 (1974).
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children had a right to minority language education. However, this holding did
not rest on the premise that members of the Chinese-American community
had a right to have their children educated in their own language rather than
English. Instead, it was based on the principle that all children had an equal right
to access the public education system provided by the state. Since the system
functioned only in English, the children’s insufcient knowledge of the latter
efectively prevented them from enjoying this public beneft, thus resulting in
discrimination along lines of national origin. But while this resulted in a duty
to provide Chinese-language instruction, it was merely a transitory obligation to
provide the afected children the means to learn sufcient English to gain efective
access to the public education system; no free-standing right to cultural security
or survival was recognized. Indeed, the USSC never questioned the legitimacy of
California’s decision to provide public education in English only. Te underlying
purpose of such a policy—ensuring that members of non-Anglophone cultures
eventually enter the English-speaking mainstream and that their cultural and
linguistic distinctiveness will gradually dissolve into the American “melting
pot”—was tacitly endorsed.98 In other words, special accommodation was merely
a stepping stone to cultural assimilation, rather than a mechanism for preserving
the minority language. Tis conficts directly with the principle of individual
linguistic equality outlined above, which protects individuals from having to
abandon their language. And, as is clear from my earlier discussion of Mahe, the
courts in Canada understand the purpose of French–English education rights to
be the preservation of distinct linguistic communities, not their disappearance.99
2.

COLLECTIVE LINGUISTIC EQUALITY

Te institutional conception of individual linguistic equality naturally leads to
a consideration of what one might call the “collective” dimensions of language
and culture, which is why the Commission ultimately found these two levels of
analysis to be inextricably linked. After analyzing the requirements of individual
equality, it concluded that a necessary pre-condition for its achievement was
the existence of a “distinct society,” an “autonomous society” or a “complete
98. Ibid at 572. As Justice Blackmun noted, “We may only guess as to why [the children]
have had no exposure to English in their preschool years. Earlier generations of American
ethnic groups have overcome the language barrier by earnest parental endeavor or by the
hard fact of being pushed out of the family or community nest and into the realities of
broader experience.”
99. For more detail, see Labelle Eastaugh, “Te Concept of a Linguistic Community,” supra
note 47 at 151-55.
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society” in which one can operate without needing to abandon one’s language
and culture.100 For the Commission, this was a necessary implication of the
institutional conception of individual equality, which is premised on the
recognition that individual experiences with respect to language and culture are
profoundly shaped by large-scale social structures and phenomena. Tis way of
framing the issue ultimately led the Commission to examine equality from the
point of view of linguistic communities.101
While it did not use this precise terminology, it is fair to say that, in the
Commission’s view, linguistic communities are collective entities, whose status
and fourishing have a substantial infuence on individual well-being.102 Much
of its attention in this regard was focused on what we might call the question of
“viability.” From an empirical standpoint, the central task that the Commission
set for itself was to ascertain whether, and under what conditions, each language
might be said to have “the means to live.”103 In order for this to be the case, each
community must have “the means to progress within its culture and to express
that culture”;104 they must both “feel that as a linguistic and cultural group they
share in the direction of economic life”;105 and, from a political standpoint,
they must either have the possibility of choosing their own institutions or of
participating fully in making decisions within a shared framework, i.e., they must
enjoy an adequate “degree of self-determination.”106 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the
Commission ultimately concluded that the French-language community did
not enjoy full equality with its English-language counterpart in most of these
respects, and that government action was a signifcant part of the problem.
As a result, its recommendations with respect to “ofcial languages” (i.e., the
use and status of each language within public institutions) were largely aimed at
correcting this problem.
Now, it bears noting that there has been some controversy over the extent
to which the ofcial language rights system protects “collective” rights.107 For
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See Report on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, supra note 85 at xxxiii, xliii.
Ibid at xliii.
Cf Labelle Eastaugh, “Te Concept of a Linguistic Community,” supra note 47.
Report on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, supra note 85 at xxix.
Ibid at xliv.
Ibid at xliv.
Ibid at xlv [emphasis removed].
Consider the very strong terms in which, prior to Mahe, a former Chief Justice of the Quebec
Superior Court condemned the notion that section 23 of the Charter protects collective
rather than individual rights. See e.g. Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards et al v AG
of Quebec et al (No 2) (1982), 140 DLR (3d) 33 (Qc Sup Ct) at 64-65, Deschênes CJSC.
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many, the cardinal virtue of the system put in place by the Trudeau government
from 1969 to 1982 was its (apparently) exclusive focus on individual rights.108
Pierre Elliot Trudeau himself was famously hostile to the concept of collective
rights, and some have argued that his approach to the language question was well
received by the English-Canadian intelligentsia, especially in Ontario, for this
very reason.109 Tis is arguably refected in the fact that the Charter did not adopt
the concept of “biculturalism” used by the Commission, but instead opted to
protect only “language” within a framework of “multiculturalism.”110 One might
therefore question whether ofcial language rights ought to be viewed as having
a collective dimension, despite the Commission’s views on the matter.
108. Consider for example the following statement by Lloyd Axworthy, a prominent member of
the Liberal party and later a leading member of Cabinet, during the debates leading up to the
1988 reform of the Ofcial Languages Act:
Te Government to which I belonged enacted the Ofcial Languages Act of 1969. At that
time, there was a clear distinction made that the protection and enhancement of ofcial
languages was in no way a qualifcation of the multicultural fact of Canada. Te two could
live side by side because in fact, when talking about language rights, we were talking about
individual rights, not group rights. Individual rights are the rights of Canadians. …
Mistakes are made at times. I refer with some trepidation to the Meech Lake Accord which
advances the concept that we are now establishing group rights in Canada, that rights are
established according to one’s collectivity, according to the group to which one belongs, not
according to the fact that one is an individual who happens to speak French or English. Tat
in itself must be looked at as a trend to be treated with some wariness. As long as we were able
to assert the principle of language rights as individual rights it did not damage or begin to
infringe upon the concept of cultural rights as we have come to understand them and use them
in this country. I believe that has been one of the successful formulas which has resulted in the
majority of western Canadians supporting and promoting the enhancement and protection of
language rights across Canada as a Canadian issue. If we fnd ourselves straying from that very
successful formula of ensuring individual rights we could be opening up an avenue of further
dispute and confict.

House of Commons Debates, 33-2, vol 11 (7 March 1988) at 13448 (Hon Lloyd Axworthy).
See also André Burelle, Le Mal canadien: essai de diagnostic et esquisse d’une thérapie (Fides,
1995) at 65. See also Pierre Elliott Trudeau, “La nouvelle trahison des clercs,” Cité libre
13:46 (April 1962) 3. For a more recent fare-up of this debate, consider the resignation
of a leading member of cabinet over the Quebec “nationhood” resolution in 2006. “Tory
Cabinet Minister Quits Post over Motion,” (27 November 2006) online: CBC News <www.
cbc.ca/news/canada/tory-cabinet-minister-quits-post-over-motion-1.585951> [https://
perma.cc/5F9F-TQD2].
109. Kenneth McRoberts, “Making Canada Bilingual: Illusions and Delusions of Federal
Language Policy” in David P Shugarman, Reginald Whitaker and Donald V Smiley
(eds), Federalism and Political Community: Essays in Honour of Donald Smiley (Broadview
Press, 1989) 161.
110. Ibid at 184. See also Russell, supra note 7 at 342.
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On the other hand, the courts have repeatedly relied on a number of
semi-theoretical statements that clearly hearken back to (and sometimes directly
quote) the framework developed by the Commission, such as the proposition
that “any broad guarantee of language rights … cannot be separated from a
concern for the culture associated with the language”;111 that “language is …
a means by which a people may express its cultural identity”;112 that language
rights support ofcial language “communities” and their “culture”;113 and that
individual language rights are justifed by the existence of the community.114
As a general matter, terms like “community” and “people” spontaneously bring
to mind something that is “qualitatively diferent” from a mere collection of
individuals,115 and it is therefore no surprise that these statements have been
used to support the recognition of what the courts have explicitly described as
“collective rights.”116
Te precise extent to which ofcial language rights are collective rights is a
complex topic in its own right, which I have explored at some length elsewhere.
Sufce it to say here that, in my view, the case law is best read as conceptualizing
the body of language rights-holders—often referred to by the term “linguistic
community”117—as a collective entity, with interests that are distinct from, and
non-reducible to, the interests of its individual members.118 If this view is correct,
it implies that the courts view generic linguistic equality as having a collective
dimension. It therefore calls for comparisons between individuals and between
linguistic communities as collective entities in appropriate circumstances.
111. Mahe, supra note 2 at 362.
112. Ford v Quebec (AG), [1988] 2 SCR 712 at 748-49 [Ford].
113. Beaulac, supra note 16 at para 17. See also Association des parents de l’école Rose‑des‑vents, supra
note 84 at para 26; Lalonde, supra note 2.
114. Beaulac, supra note 16 at para 20.
115. See Dunmore v Ontario (AG), 2001 SCC 94 at para 17 [Dunmore]. Consider the following
remarks by Justice Bastarache on behalf of the majority in Dunmore in relation to s 2(d)
of the Charter:
As I see it, the very notion of “association” recognizes the qualitative diferences between
individuals and collectivities. It recognizes that the press difers qualitatively from the
journalist, the language community from the language speaker, the union from the worker.
In all cases, the community assumes a life of its own and develops needs and priorities that
difer from those of its individual members. Tus, for example, a language community cannot
be nurtured if the law protects only the individual’s right to speak.

116. See Arsenault‑Cameron v Prince Edward Island, 2000 SCC 1 at para 29.
117. See e.g. Charter, supra note 1 at section 16.1; Ofcial Languages Act, supra note 19 at
section 41.
118. See generally Labelle Eastaugh, “Te Concept of a Linguistic Community,” supra note 47.
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3.

LIMITS

I wish to be clear that what I have outlined above is a possible description of the
normative patterns already present in authoritative sources, and not a justifcation.
It is also an incomplete description, for I have ofered no clear explanation of
what might count as a relevant cost or beneft in the context of these distributive
principles. Even assuming that my proposal is correct, further work will be
necessary to develop this aspect of it, as well as to determine how, or even whether
such principles can be justifed from a moral standpoint. Tis further efort may
in fact demonstrate that it is possible to generate a single principle, analogous
to the concept of equality of dignity, that exists at a higher level of abstraction
and that both explains and justifes the principles outlined above.119 Conversely,
it may demonstrate the impossibility of folding both principles into a unifed and
coherent normative framework, which might suggest that the law—or at least its
internal account of itself—needs to change. Ultimately, a plausible attempt on
either score will require a more comprehensive account than I have ofered here.
C. WHITHER “SUBSTANTIVE” EQUALITY?

One fnal comment before concluding on this point. Given that the “substantive”
character of linguistic equality was asserted with such force in Beaulac and in the
case law since then, the reader may reasonably wonder what we are to make of this
notion under my account. Must it be completely jettisoned? I do not believe so.
As I noted above, such a distinction, to the extent that it has any content, will
be parasitic upon the underlying axiomatic constraints that defne the purpose of
an equality guarantee. It therefore cannot form the basis for a genuine account
of the right. However, if one has a good grasp of those constraints, it may be
possible and even helpful to articulate a schematic binary of that kind to serve as
a heuristic in future cases. In light of the principles outlined above, I believe there
is in fact a way of framing this dichotomy in a manner that captures the general
pattern of decisions viewed as either “narrow” or “generous.”
In my view, a proposed interpretation of a right that conceives English
or French merely as abstract codes can be thought of as a “narrow” or “formal”
conception. By contrast, a conception of the right that views them as being,
in addition to codes, social phenomena capable of afecting access to public
services and the distributive efects of government policy (amongst other things),
can be thought of as a “broad” or “substantive” one. My proposal stems from the
observation that any natural language is both a code and a social phenomenon.
119. Doucet, “L’égalite dans Lalonde et al c Commission,” supra note 29 at 276.
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As a code, a language is an abstract set of symbols created for the purposes of
satisfying the “technical requirements of communication,”120 i.e., storing or
transmitting information. However, one can use a code without any guarantee
of being understood by another person. Actual understanding, by contrast,
is an emergent property of a social relation between a speaker and a listener,
both of whom must comprehend the code being used as well as the nature and
context of the communicative activity in which they are engaged. Accordingly,
any reference to a particular language in a constitutional or statutory text can
be taken to designate either a code simpliciter, or a complex cluster, or social
relations centered on that code.
Tis framing captures what I believe to be the underlying division between
those decisions that have come to be viewed as narrow, formal, and therefore
illegitimate, and those that instead seek to “breath life” into the relevant language
right.121 Consider the Trilogy. Since there can be no communication without
comprehension, conceptualizing English or French as a “means of communication,”
as Justice Wilson did, is in fact to view them as social phenomena, for it interprets
them as denoting a particular kind of social relation. It is thus a “substantive”
reading under this formulation of the dichotomy. By contrast, holding that the
right to receive services in either English or French includes only the right to
have that language be used as the vehicle for delivery—as the lower courts did in
DesRochers, and as the province argued in Mahe—is to conceive of them merely
as codes, for it overlooks the fact that each language represents a pattern of social
relations with the potential to alter access to, or beneft from, the service at issue.
Te fact that apparently identical approaches—i.e., treating English and
French as “means of communication”—can be construed so diferently is in fact
implicit in the institutional conception of linguistic equality. Te latter holds that
the nature of the protected interest must be understood within the broader context
of the institutional setting in which the right is meant to operate (meaning, for
example, that one would have to consider the general purpose of the service
being ofered, as the SCC held in DesRochers).122 Since a judicial proceeding is,
fundamentally, an extended exercise in communication, it is perfectly reasonable
that this would be the social relation of central interest. Other public institutions,
however, while often depending on communication to function, frequently aim to
provide other goods. Te institutional conception of linguistic equality holds that
such goods must be distributed with regard to a wider range of social relations.
120. Cf Pierre Bourdieu, Langage et pouvoir symbolique (Fayard, 2001) at 74.
121. See Mahe, supra note 2 at 365.
122. DesRochers SCC, supra note 42 at para 51.
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Of course, as I pointed out earlier, sometimes formal equality is the primary
concern. A government institution that lacks any ability to use the required
language can be a serious problem, even if this is simply a breach of “formal”
linguistic equality. My distinction is therefore not intended to minimize the
importance of such failures, which sadly remain all too common, but rather to
highlight that this is but a small portion of what linguistic equality is meant to
protect. To that extent, it can be used as an aid in thinking through the possible
interpretations of a given language right.

VII.LINGUISTIC EQUALITY AND THE CONSTITUTION
Having laid the foundations for a preliminary account of linguistic equality,
what can we say about its relationship to other forms of equality recognized
by the Constitution? At the very least, there is reason to think that both
linguistic and general equality rights may have a common parentage. Both the
Commission reports and the case law view language rights as having a link to
general equality. Te Commission thought of linguistic equality as resting on
roughly the same foundations as general equality (individual autonomy and
dignity) and understood the project of “biculturalism” as an attempt to more
fully realize those principles, not compete with them. And although the case
law distinguishes between general equality rights and language rights as a matter
of law, it nonetheless sees them as inhabiting a conceptual continuum of sorts.
For instance, in Beaulac, the SCC held that equality in a language rights context
must be viewed as “substantive” equality, as this is the norm applicable under
Canadian law, noting that “[e]quality does not have a lesser meaning in matters
of language.”123 What this implies about the protected interests is unclear, but it
does speak to the belief that there exists a continuity between the two concepts,
suggesting that the values underpinning general equality may play a role in
accounting for ofcial language rights.
At the same time, there is no escaping the fact that, as a matter of
constitutional law, linguistic equality currently protects only two communities.
It might therefore be read as creating a hierarchy amongst languages or cultures.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that the concept of “biculturalism” was
reintroduced by the courts as a framework for interpreting language rights, even
though the Pierre Elliot Trudeau government deliberately set it aside in favour

123. Beaulac, supra note 16 at para 22. Te SCC has also confated language rights with general
non-discrimination rights in other contexts. See e.g. Tibodeau v Air Canada, 2014 SCC 67.
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of “multiculturalism.”124 Does this imply that general and linguistic equality are
in confict, and that the latter is an exception to the former? And if so, does that
count as a reason against the current ofcial language rights system?
As I see it, there are least two strategies one might adopt in attempting to
respond to these concerns. On the one hand, one could argue that both forms of
equality are grounded in the same principles and protect the same interests, and
that the current edifce of rights is merely incomplete. In other words, ofcial
language rights only appear to single out two languages for special treatment
because they are more detailed than general equality rights. On this account, the
greater specifcity of ofcial language rights merely refects a consensus that such
rights are warranted and workable in the case of English and French, without
excluding the possibility that they also exist for other languages. Additional
sociocultural groups may enjoy the same rights, provided that the case can be
made that they are required in light of their particular circumstances.125 Of course,
there might be some limits as to how far one could take such reasoning, at least
from a legal perspective, since an argument of this kind, even if anchored in
section 15 of the Charter, could do nothing to alter the “ofcial” status of English
and French, which is constitutionally entrenched. However, it is unclear whether
“ofcial” status has any practical efect separable from the operative terms of
section 16(1).126 If it does not—that is, if it is merely symbolic—then this would
leave open the possibility of inferring the full range of protections currently
aforded English and French from a principle of general equality.
A diferent approach would be to acknowledge that ofcial language rights
are an exception to general equality, but that this special treatment is justifed.
For example, one might argue that rights can be “group-diferentiated,” to borrow
Will Kymlicka’s terminology, and need not be universal. Te frst step here would
be to acknowledge that legal rights can be justifed in diferent ways, and that
a legal right can be morally justifed without necessarily corresponding to a
universal moral right.127 David Miller, for instance, has identifed three primary
types of legal rights, which are distinguished by the nature of their justifcation:
124. See e.g. Association des parents de l’école Rose‑des‑vents, supra note 84 at para 25. Before
the SCC’s ruling in Mahe, this had led some lower courts to read language rights more
restrictively. See e.g. Reference re Public Schools Act (Manitoba) (s 79(3), 4, 7), [1990] 2
WWR 289 (Man CA).
125. See e.g. Green, supra note 13 at 666.
126. Consider Justice Wilson’s analysis of section 16(1) of the Charter in Société des Acadiens. See
Société des Acadiens, supra note 9 at 618-19.
127. David Miller, “Group Rights, Human Rights and Citizenship” (2002) 10 Eur J
Phil 178 at 181.
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(1) human rights, (2) justifed legal rights, and (3) citizenship rights.128 Human
rights are “grounded in features of personhood that human beings everywhere
share … such as personal security, freedom of thought and bodily movement,
and so forth.”129 Justifed legal rights, by contrast, are legal rights granted on the
basis of some policy consideration, which may be nothing more than a balance
of interests, rather than a moral right.130 Finally, citizenship rights are rights that
fow from membership in a specifc political community. Within that community
they can be viewed as morally fundamental, but their content and confguration
will be determined by the terms on which that community is founded.131
Te concept of citizenship rights, or something like it, ofers a means of
explaining why it is that specifc cultural communities can claim particular rights
vis-à-vis their own states that may not correspond to any universal right. Te
notion captures a widely shared intuition that some portion of the content of
political morality is necessarily local in origin, and shaped by the distinctive
historical experience of each particular society.132 As a result, the circumstances of
history can justify the provision of certain goods on a limited basis that otherwise
might appear discriminatory. For example, one can justify fnancial transfers
to African Americans as a response to the legacy of slavery, even though other
individuals or groups being left out are similarly situated from an economic
standpoint. Perhaps the legitimacy of linguistic equality fows from the broader
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid at 181-82.
130. For a similar distinction between what he calls “social human rights” and “social citizenship
rights,” see Jef King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 18-19.
131. Miller, supra note 123 at 182. On this point, consider the concurring reasons of Justice
Wilson in Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486 [Re BC Motor Vehicle Act] (discussing
the meaning of “principles of fundamental justice,” Justice Wilson notes that “[w]e know
what ‘fundamental principles’ are. Tey are the basic, bedrock principles that underpin a
system” at para 122).
132. See e.g. Green, supra note 13 at 664-65; Patten, supra note 14 at 247. See also Cardinal, supra
note 14 at 222-23; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Teory of Minority
Rights (Clarendon Press, 1995) 116-120; Doucet, “Langue mérite-t-elle une protection?”
supra note 17 at 62. In this connection, consider Joseph Carens’ concept of justice as
“even-handedness.” Joseph H Carens, Culture, Citizenship, and Community: A Contextual
Exploration of Justice as Evenhandedness (Oxford University Press, 2000) at 3. Jacob Levy
makes a similar point when he notes that “a state’s avowed self-understanding acquires
normative force of its own.” Jacob T Levy, “Language Rights, Literacy, and the Modern
State” in Will Kymlicka & Alan Patten, eds, Language rights and political theory (Oxford
University Press, 2003) 247. See also Stephen Tierney, “Refections on the Evolution of
Language Rights” in André Braën, Pierre Foucher & Yves Le Bouthillier, eds, Languages,
Constitutionalism and Minorities/Langues, constitutionnalisme et minorité (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2006) 10 at 10-11.
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matrix of political values that, as a result of historical experience, have come to
govern our sense of constitutional justice.
One advantage of this approach is that it can account for what appear to be
inconsistencies in the SCC’s approach to interpreting language rights without
needing to jettison a major strand of judicial thinking. For many years, the case
law was divided between the “political compromise doctrine” adopted in the
Trilogy,133 according to which language rights are peculiar to Canada and thus
non-universal, and the more principled approach followed in the Reference Re
Manitoba Language Rights,134 Ford,135 Mahe and later Beaulac. In the Trilogy,
the Court’s thinking was driven by the sense that language rights are contextual
in nature, meaning that their justifcation is derived from a specifc set of
circumstances, and that to ignore this is to risk doing violence to their democratic
legitimacy. Tis is fair enough, but as the SCC noted in Mercure, and as it stated
even more unequivocally in the Secession Reference, it need not imply that language
rights are not principled in nature, and thus non-seminal, lesser rights.136 Viewing
them as fundamental citizenship rights enables one to reconcile both intuitions,
for, as others have already argued,137 being born of “compromise” does not make
it impossible for a constitutional provision to have a principled basis. Sometimes,
the very subject matter of a compromise is the adoption of a principle.
I cannot explore these issues any further here. However, it is worth noting
that the extent to which the two approaches outlined above ultimately difer is
somewhat unclear, given that many leading accounts of group diferentiated rights
can be reformulated in terms of general equality. Such accounts typically assert,
either implicitly or explicitly, that language or cultural rights are justifed as the
means to secure equality in the distribution of, or access to, some fundamental
good. For example, Kymlicka’s well-known account is ultimately based on an
argument that individuals have a right to equality of autonomy, which as a
practical matter requires that the state ofer some protection and support to the
cultural structures within which autonomy is exercised.138 Similarly, the argument
developed by Green and Réaume can be seen as resting on the premise that there
is a right to equality of linguistic security.139 Alan Patten’s most recent account
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See MacDonald, supra note 9; Société des Acadiens, supra note 9; Bilodeau, supra note 9.
[1985] 1 SCR 721.
Supra note 108.
Mercure, supra note 9 at 268; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 80.
See generally Green & Réaume, “Second-Class Rights,” supra note 13.
Kymlicka, supra note 129.
Réaume, “Te Constitutional Protection of Language,” supra note 14; Green, supra note 13;
Green & Réaume, “Second-Class Rights” supra note 13.
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is even more explicit, as he frames his argument as being premised on a right to
equal recognition.140 Tus, it may be that even a “group-diferentiated rights”
account of linguistic equality would resolve, at a high level of abstraction, into a
claim based in a principle of general equality.

140. Patten, supra note 18.

